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I. INTRODUCTION 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c) states in pertinent part, "The appellant or cross-appellant may 
file a brief in reply to the brief of the respondent or cross-respondent within the time limit 
specified by Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) which may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the 
contentions of the respondent." 
This Reply Brief contains "additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions" of the 
Respondents. 
This Reply Brief is necessarily limited to the current Record on Appeal as of the filing 
deadline for this brief of February 16, 2010. Prior to the filing deadline, Appellant's filed a 
motion to augment the record with additional exhibits and transcripts. A decision on the motion 
to augment will not occur until aRer the deadline for filing the brief of February 16, 2010. Any 
briefing dealing with any documents or transcripts augmented to the record pursuant to 
Appellant's motion will be presented in supplemental briefing if allowed by this Court. 
The facts presented and course of proceedings in this matter set forth in Appellant's Brief 
were not disputed by Respondent. Respondent's Brief, p. 1. 
11. ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court's review of the District Court's Decision on Defendant Robertson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is appropriate because it effectively granted to Respondent 
partial s w a r y  judgment finding that LC. 3 49-2417 applies to implements of husbandry and 
that I.C. 5 49-916 and LC. Ej 49-903 require owners of implements of husbandry to have 
operational lighting systems at all times. This Court should reverse the District Court's decision 
with regard to those issues. 
The District Court abused its discretion in failing to uphold the jury's answers to the 
specific interrogatories on the Special Verdict Form by granting a new trial. This Court should 
reverse the District Court's decision granting a new trial. 
A) The District Court Erred in Deciding That Imputed Liability Applied to 
Implements of Husbandry. 
1. Standard of Review 
The proper standard of review in this matter is that which applies to District Court 
decisions granting motions for summary judgment. This standard was set forth in Appellant's 
Brief. Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9. 
This Court has held, "Summary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the 
moving party, and on any or all of the causes of action involved, under the rules of civil 
procedure." Bvummett v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724, 726, 682 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1984). This ruling 
was reiterated in Hawood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001). In Hawood, this 
Court expanded upon the ruling set forth in Brummet, by stating: "The district court may grant 
sunlmary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the 
court. A motion for s m a r y  judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as 
a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it, as in this case." 
Id. at 677, 39 P.3d at 617. 
The District Court in this matter granted to the non-moving party, Respondent, partial 
summary judgment on the allegation of imputed liability under I.C. § 49-2417. Appellant 
brought the motion for summary judgment arguing that LC. 5 49-2417 did not apply to the 
implement of husbandry owned by Appellant. R. 482, Defendant Roberton's Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-8-06 at 12. This issue involved the 
undisputed fact that the Appellant's vehicles involved in the accident were a tractor pulling an 
implement of husbandry. Due to the relevant facts being undisputed and admitted, the District 
Court simply ruled upon the issue in favor of Respondent. 
The District Court's ruling did not simply deny Appellant's motion for summary 
judgment based upon their being a genuine issue of fact, but ruled positively, "that an implement 
of husbandry (i.e., a tractor pulling a hay baler) constitutes a motor vehicle for purposes of Idaho 
Code 5 49-2417. R. p. 444. Regarding this ruling, the District Court did not state that any 
further fact-finding was necessary. The effect of the District Court's decision is that Respondent 
was granted partial summary judgment on the issue of imputed liability. 
The Respondents cited authority in the Respondents' Brief regarding appealing denials of 
motions for summary judgment. Respondents' Brief, pp. 3-5. Appellant does not dispute that 
these cases are applicable to circumstances where a district court has only denied a motion for 
summary judgment finding that the matter must proceed to trial in order to have a fact-finder 
determine the outcome of the issue. These cases are not applicable to instances where a district 
court has ruled in favor of a non-moving party essentially granting partial summary judgment in 
their favor. 
Unlike the case of Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007) relied upon by 
Respondents, Appellant is requesting that this Court rule on those issues in the District Court's 
decision where it effectively grants summary judgment in favor of Respondent and not asking 
this Court to carve out an exception to the rule that denials of motions for summary judgment 
cannot be reviewed on appeal. As established above, the District Court in this matter granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents in regard to the issue of imputed liability. 
Therefore, the issue of the applicability of LC. 3 49-2417 to implements of husbandry is 
appealable to this Court under the standard of review governing the review of a district court's 
granting of summary judgment. This standard of review was set forth in Appellant's Brief and 
was not disputed by Respondents. Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9. 
2. LC. 6 49-2417 (1) Does Not Impute Liability upon the Owner of an Implement of 
13usbandrv 
The following recitation of authority was originally cited in the Appellant's Brief, but is 
reproduced for ease of reference. The construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of 
law for this Court to decide. Crauford v. Dept. of Correcfions, I33 Idaho 633,635,991 P.2d 358, 
360 (1999). Courts also exercise free review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v. 
Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602,605,990 P.2d 1213,1216, (1999). 
"Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes by ascertaining and giving effect 
to legislative intent." Easley v. Lee, 11 1 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986) citing: Nampa 
Lodge No. 1389 a? Smylie, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1951). "The act should be construed in its 
entirety and as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, and where different 
sections reflect light upon each other they are regarded as inpari materia." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, "'all parts of a statute should be given meaning,' 
and the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered 
superfluous or insignificant."' Morelandv. Adam, 143 Idaho 687,690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007) 
citing: Idaho Cardiolop Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 
108 P.3d 370,373 (2005). 
The relevant statutes in this matter are all found in the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act (the 
"Act"). 
Idaho Code 3 49-2417(1) provides: 
4 
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury 
to a person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor 
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or 
operating the vehicle with the permission, express implied, of the owner, and the 
negligence of the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil 
damages. (Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code 3 49-2417(1) by its plain language applies only to "motor vehicles" as 
defined in this statute and not to the tractor and baler that are at issue in this lawsuit. A motor 
vehicle is defined under I.C. 5 49-123 (g) as: 
Every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by 
electric power obtained by overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, 
except vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive 
mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs. 49-123(g) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 49-1 10(2), the applicable definitions section of the Act, a farm 
tractor when drawing an implement of husbandry such as a baler is to be defined as an 
implement of husbandry for purposes of the Act: 
"Implements of husbandry" means every vehicle including self-propelled unh ,  designed 
or adapted and used exclusively in agricultural, horticultural, dairy and livestock growing 
and feeding operations when being incidentally operated. Such implements include, but 
are not limited to, combines, discs, dry and liquid fertilizer spreaders, cargo tanks, 
harrows, hay balers, harvesting and stacking equipment, pesticide applicators, plows, 
swathers, mint tubs and mint wagons, and farm wagons. A farm tractor when attached to 
or drawing any implement of husbandry shall be construed to be an implement of 
husbandry. "Implements of husbandry" do not include semitrailers, nor do they include 
motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits their use to agricultural, horticultural, 
dairy or livestock growing and feeding operations. (Emphasis added). 
This provision specifically states that implements of husbandry do not include motor 
vehicles. Because the tractor and baler are defined as an implement of husbandry and not as a 
motor vehicle for purposes of the Act, the legislature has through its definitions exempted 
implements of husbandry from the imputed liability provision of Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1). 
Where, as here, Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1) specifically applies only to motor vehicles, 
implements of husbandry are excluded from imputed liability pursuant to this provision of the 
Act. Under the rule of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as well as the 
plain language of the statutes themselves, Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1) is inapplicable to the case at 
bar. See Poison Creek Publishing, Inc., v. Central Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426,3 P.3d 
1254 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The District Court in ruling that LC. 3 49-2417 includes the tractor and hay baler at issue 
presumes that a hay baler becomes a motor vehicle simply because it is attached to a tractor. The 
District Court essentially admitted that many, if not most implements of husbandry would be 
excluded from I.C. 3 49-2417. The District Court stated that, "To be sure, hay balers do not 
constitute motor vehicles." R., p. 451. Here the District Court essentially admits that despite 
the Idaho Legislature not specifically excluding implements of husbandry from I.C. 3 49-2417, it 
does exclude hay balers and any other implements of husbandry not self-propelled. 
The District Court and Respondents fail to address the fact that it was the hay baler that 
the deceased's vehicle impacted, not the tractor. The assumption made by the District Court and 
Respondents is that once a hay baler is connected to a tractor, the hay baler becomes a motor 
vehicle under LC. 3 49-123 (g). Rather, the Idaho Legislature took the steps necessary to specify 
that when a tractor is attached to a hay baler it becomes an implement of husbandry, not that the 
hay baler becomes a motor vehicle. LC. § 49-1 lO(2). By defining implements of husbandry in 
I.C. 3 49-1 10(2), the Idaho Legislature shows its intent is to not treat implements of husbandry as 
motor vehicles. Idaho Code § 49-2417 does not apply to implements of husbandry, because the 
Idaho Legislature does not treat implements of husbandry as motor vehicles. The Legislature's 
intent then is that a hay baler should not be treated differently under the Act simply because it is 
attached to a tractor. Interpreting I.C. Ej 49-2417 to apply to this hay baler would be going 
against the plain intent of the Legislature. 
Based upon the plain intent of the Idaho Legislature, Appellant's request that this Court 
reverse the District Court's decision and rule that LC. 5 49-2417 does not apply to hay balers 
even when they are attached to tractors. 
B. The District Court Erred in Deciding that I.C. §§ 49-902, 903 and 916 Requires 
Implements of Husbandry to Have an Operational Lighting System at All Times. 
1. Standard of Review 
As with the District Court's decision regarding imputed liability under I.C. 5 49-2417, the 
District Court's effectively granted partial summary judgment to Respondent on the issue 
whether LC. $ 5  49-902, 903 and 916 require implements of husbandry to have an operational 
lighting system at all times. Pursuant to the argument above, the standard of review on appeal 
for this issue is the standard applied to a district court's decision granting summary judgment. 
2. Idaho Code 66 49-902. 903 and 916 do not Reauire Imulements of Husbandrv to 
Have Ouerational Lighting Systems at all Times 
This inquiry also involves the interpretation of Idaho statutes and the previously provided 
case citations regarding statutory interpretation apply in this instance and throughout our brief. 
Respondents' First Amended Complaint alleges negligence per se against Appellant. 
Respondents' allegation of negligence per se in this case is predicated on the improper 
interpretation of LC. 5 49-916. In support of their claim for negligenceper se against Appellant, 
Respondents alleged that "[bly allowing Mr. Dustin Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on a 
public road after sunset without visible tail lights or reflectors, Appellate Robertson was in direct 
violation of the provisions of Idaho Code § 49-916." R, p. 42, Plaintiffs First Amended 
Complaint, ll 37. 
The relevant provisions relating to this question are Idaho Code $ 5  49-902(1) and (3); 49- 
903; 49-916(3) and (4). These code sections were set forth in the Appellant's Brief in full, but 
are reproduced in this brief for convenience. Idaho Code 5 49-902(1) and (3) state (Emphasis 
added): 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, or for the owner to cause or 
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in an unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not 
contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with the lamps and other requirements 
in proper condition and adjustment, as required by the provisions of this chapter, or 
which is equipped in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter. 
(3) The provisions of this chapter, with respect to equipment on vehicles, shall not apply 
to implements of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or slow moving 
vehicles except as otherwise specifically made applicable. 
Idaho Code 5 49-903 states: 
Every vehicle upon a highway at any time from sunset to sunrise and at any other 
time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and 
vehicles on the highway at a distance of five hundred (500) feet ahead shall display 
lighted lamps and illuminating devices as here respectively required for different 
classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles as stated 
herein. 
Idaho Code 4 49-916(3) and (4) state: 
(3) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled unit of farm equipment or 
implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting system shall at all times 
specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with two (2) single-beam or 
multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of sections 49-922 or 49-924, 
Idaho Code, respectively or, as an alternative, section 49-926, Idaho Code, and two 
(2) red lamps visible from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet to the 
rear, or in the alternative, one (1) red lamp visible from a distance of not less than 
five hundred (500) feet to the rear and two (2) red reflectors visible from a distance 
of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to the rear when illuminated by the 
upper beams of head lamps. Red lamps or reflectors shall be mounted in the rear 
of the farm tractor or self-propelled implement of husbandry to indicate as nearly 
as practicable the extreme left and right projections of the vehicle on the highway. 
(4) The farm tractor element of every combination of farm tractor and towed farm 
equipment or towed implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting 
system shall at all times specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with 
two (2) single-beam or multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of 
sections 49-922,49-924, or 49-926, Idaho Code. 
These provisions of the Idaho Code prohibit the operation of an implement of husbandry 
on a public roadway between "sunset" and "sunrise" and "at any other time when there is not 
sufficient light" without the equipment required by LC. 9 49-916. This standard applies to any 
person operating the relevant machinery. 
The statutory duty of an owner of an implement of husbandry is further limited by I.C. 9 
49-902(1) at times when they are not the operator of the vehicle, by requiring that there be a 
showing the owner "cause[d] or knowingly permit[ted] to be driven" a vehicle that is in violation 
of the specific requirements of the chapter. LC. $49-902(1) 
The question of whether a statute imposes a duty upon a particular person or entity is a 
question of law which the Court freely reviews. Mugavero v. A-I Auto Sales, Inc., 130 Idaho 
554, 557, 954 P.2d 141, 154 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, in reviewing Respondent's negligence 
per se claim, this Court may make its own determination for purposes of appeal whether the 
statute cited by Respondents establishes a duty on behalf of Appellant as a matter of law. 
The Idaho Legislature has also created a separate standard for implements of husbandry 
than for other vehicles. The District Court erred by essentidly finding that Appellant had a duty 
to ensure that his implements of husbandry had operational lighting systems at all times. The 
District Court began by setting forth the appropriate statutes, but misapplied the holding of State 
v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 6 P.3d 416 (Ct.App. 2000) in d i n g  that, "if the lighting equipment is 
not operational as required by Idaho Code 9 49-916 with regard to farm equipment, one simply 
does not move it on a highway. To do so, violates the plain provisions of statutory law, which 
Defendant Robertson allowed with Dustin Kukla. R, p. 441. As discussed above, the above- 
quoted portion shows that the District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent by ruling that Appellant, Defendant Robertson, violated LC. rj 49-916. 
The District Court erred in it analysis because the Evans case is not directly applicable in 
this matter because it did not involve an implement of husbandry which is treated differently 
than a normal vehicle under I.C. rj 49-902. As set forth in more detail in the Appellant's Brief, 
the Evans case deals with an individual driving a car not an implement of husbandry. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17. The Court of Appeals in Evans did not address the difference in 
the statutory language and differing requirements between I.C. rj 49-905 and I.C. rj 49-916. 
The District Court also failed to analyze the plain language of I.C. rj 49-902(3) and LC. rj 
49-916 in applying the holding of Evans to implements of husbandry, including Appellant's hay 
baler. The District Court and Respondents overlook the fact that Idaho Code rj 49-902(1) must 
be read in conjunction with the plaint language of LC. rj 49-902(3) which states that, "The 
provisions of this chapter (including I.C. rj 49-902(1)), with respect to equipment on vehicles, 
shall not apply to implements of husbandry ... except as otherwise specifically made 
applicable." I.C. rj 49-902(3) (Emphasis added). The Idaho Legislature essentially stated that 
LC. rj 49-902(1) has no applicability to implements of husbandry unless some provision 
specifically makes it applicable. The Legislature's intent is to treat implements of husbandry 
different from other motor vehicles. 
The equipment rules for implements of husbandry are specifically set forth in LC. rj 49- 
916. Unlike LC. rj 49-905 that was interpreted in Evans, LC. rj 49-916 contains the following 
language preceding the equipment requirements in each of its major subparagraphs, "shall at all 
times specified in section 49-903". Idaho Code rj 49-916 limits the equipment requirements to 
the times set forth in I.C. 5  49-903, not the times set forth in I.C. 5  49-902(1). The inclusion of 
the specific reference to LC. § 49-903 in I.C. 5 49-916 is especially revealing considering the 
omission of any reference to LC. 3 49-903 in LC. § §  49-905, 906,907,909 and 915. 
The District Court and Respondents analyze LC. 5  49-902(1); I.C. 5 49-903 and I.C. 5 
49-916 as if the language in them and how they relate to one another were ambiguous. They 
both attempt to interpret the Idaho Legislature's intent by using the rule of statutory construction 
in para materia. The application of this and other rules of statutory construction is only 
appropriate if the legislative intent cannot be discerned by the plain meaning of the language of 
the statutes. Unlike LC. § 49-905 interpreted in Evans, LC. 5  49-916 by plain language limits its 
requirements to the times set forth in I.C. 5 49-903. To interpret the requirements of I.C. 5  49- 
916 to be required at all times would be to impermissibly render meaningless the limiting phrase 
in I.C. 3 49-916, "shall at all times specified in section 49-903". 
The District Court's decision that lighting requirements of LC. 5  49-916 are required at 
all times and that Appellant violated this statute should be reversed. 
C) The Jury's Verdict that Appellate Robertson's Actions were not a Proximate Cause 
of the Respondents' Injuries Should be Upheld? 
1 .  Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court has stated that: "This Court reviews the grant of a motion for a new 
trial based upon I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) under an abuse of discretion standard." Warren v. Sharp, 139 
Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003); quoting: Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg? Med. Ctr., 135 
Idaho 775,781,25 P.3d 88,94 (2001). 
"To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers 
whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 
46, 5 1, 995 P.2d 8 16, 82 1 (2000); citing: Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40, 
981 P.2d 1 146, 1 150 (1999). 
When faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look at the 
evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way." 
Cook V. State, Dept. of Tramp. 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), Griflth v. Latham 
Motors, Inc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572,576 (1996). 
2. The District Court Failed to Act Within Its Discretion 
The District Court's order is devoid of any discussion of its discretion or the legal standards 
it is to apply in reviewing a potentially inconsistent special verdict. R., pp. 453-455. At the hearing 
on the motion for new trial the District C o k  stated: 
It is a motion for a new trial, which is a little bit different than when you renew a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because what it does is it calls upon me to 
weigh the evidence, and determine, one, whether the verdict was against - my' view - by the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
And then, secondly whether a new trial would produce a different result. 
So, essentially, that's my mission, because I have a broader discretion than, say, a 
motion for a directed verdict or nlv - that's a law thing. But, this is a "weight" thing. 
So, with this weighty issue, Mr. Nicholson, it's your motion, I will allow you to go 
first. 
Tr. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial - September 15,2008, p. 19, L. 11-23. Here the District Court 
states that he has broad discretion and states two determinations he has to make in regard to the 
motion for new trial. Namely, whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and 
whether a new trial would produce a different result. These standards are the standards for 
analyzing a motion for new trial under IRCP 59(a)(6). In order to grant a new trial pursuant to 
IRCP 59(a)(6) on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against the law, the trial court must determine both (I) the jury verdict is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, and (2) a new trial would produce a different result. City of McCall v. 
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18, (Idaho 2006); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d 
188 (1990. 
Despite the District Court's statements at the hearing, the District Court's Order on Motion 
for New Trial does not adequately address these two questions. The District Court does not 
comment on whether a new trial would produce a different result and does not state that the verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence. It is apparent that there is a discrepancy between the 
District Court's statement regarding its discretion at the hearing and its treatment of the matter in its 
order. As pointed out by Respondent, the District Court is granting the motion for new trial 
pursuant to IRCP 49@). 
Further, the District Court did not cite to any applicable legal standards that would apply to 
its discretion. Most importantly, the District Court did not acknowledge the standard set forth above 
which is that when faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look 
at the evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's 
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way." 
Cook v. State, Dept. of Tmnsp. 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), Grz$th v. Latham 
Motors, Znc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572,576 (1996). In regard to this standard, the District 
Court apparently did not consider the direction in IRCP 49@) for dealing with inconsistencies in a 
special verdict form that, "When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is 
inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with 
the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict . . .." IRCP 49(b). 
The District Court failed to acknowledge certain standards when considering the motion for 
new trial and did not adequately address the standards that it did reference at the hearing in the 
order. The District Court abused its discretion in granting the motion for new trial. 
The jury consistently found that the actions of Appellant were not a proximate cause of 
Respondent's damages. The special verdict form instructed the jury that if they answered yes to the 
questions regarding proximate cause as to any of the claims for any of the parties, then they were to 
proceed to Question 10 pertaining to fault. Question 10 then instructed the jury to apportion fault. 
The jury is then advised that the sum must equaI 100%. 
In the present case, it is clear that the jury did not intend to find that the actions of Appellant 
Robertson were the proximate cause of Respondent's damages. Each time the question was asked 
with respect to proximate cause as to AppeIIant Robertson, the jury answered "No." Neither the 
District Court nor Respondent state or argue that the jury's responses that Appellant was not a 
proximate cause of the damages went against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. 
Similarly, neither the District Court nor Respondent argue that another jury would find differently 
than the present jury found with regard to the special interrogatories regarding negligence and 
proximate cause. 
The sole dispute is the contention that a special verdict form that has responses to specific 
questions which are inconsistent with the general verdict are against the law. As stated in IRCP 
49(b), special verdict forms that have inconsistencies between the answers to the interrogatories and 
the general verdict are not u n l a d ,  but can be remedied by having the district court enter judgment 
in accordance with the specific answers. 
A jury verdict which does not violate Idaho law should be cast aside so lightly. Such a 
result would undermine the principle of the finality of trials. If at all possible, the jury's verdict 
should be upheld. The District Court's failure to recognize the legal standards for deciding these 
issues establishes that it abused its discretion. 
Appellant therefore requests that this Court find that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent 
and reverse the District Court's decision granting Respondent's motion for new trial. 
1II.CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts presented and the record on appeal, this Court should reverse the 
District Court's rulings on (1) Appellant's motion for summary judgment and (2) Respondents' 
motion for new trial. 
The District Court misinterpreted case law and statutes in finding that owners of 
implements of husbandry are subject to imputed liability under I.C. 5 49-2417. The District 
Court also failed to properly analyze LC. $5 49-902(1) and (3); 49-903 and 49-916, in finding 
that implements of husbandry are required to have the lighting requirements of I.C. 9 49-916 at 
all times. 
The District Court abused its discretion in granting the motion for new trial and should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 16' day of February 2010. 
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